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THE EFFECTS OF OUTBOUND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ON
THE DOMESTIC CAPITAL STOCK
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effect of outbound foreign direct investment (PD!) on the
domesticcapital stock. The firstpart of the paper shows that only about 20 percent of the value
of assets owned byU.S.affiliates abroad is financed bycross-borderflows of capital from the
United States. An additional 18 per centrepresentsretained earnings atiributable to U.S.
investors. The rest is financed locally by foreign debt and equity.
The second part of the paper analyzes data for the major industrial countries of the OECD
and finds that each dollar of cross-border flow of foreign direct investment reduces domestic
investment by approximately one dollar.
This dollar for dollar displacement of domestic investment by outbound FDI is consistent
with the Feldstein-Horioka picture of segmented capital markets. It suggests that while portfolio
funds are largely segmented into national capital markets, direct investment can achieve cross-
border capital flows. A dollar outflow of direct investment reduces domestic investment by a
dollar and this is not offset by a change in international portfolio invstment. This ability of
foreign direct investment to circumvent the segmented national capital markets also appears in
the expanded use of foreign debt and equity capital to finance the capital accumulation of foreign
affiliates of U.S. finns.
Taken together, these estimates suggest that each dollar of foreign assets acquired by U.S.
foreign affiliates reduces the U.S. domestic capital stock by between 20 cents and 38 cents.
Equivalently, this implies that each dollar of displaced domestic capital in the United States adds
between $2.60 and $5.00 to the capital stock of U.S. foreign affiliates.
Martin Feldstein
Harvard University and NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge. MA 02138The EffectsotOutbound Forei2n Direct Investment
on the DomesticCapital Stock
Martin Feldstein
Foreign direct investment plays an important role in the international transfer of both
capital and technology and has a significant impact on the pattern of international trade. The
most recent detailed government survey of U.S. direct investment abroad found that in 1989 the
foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations had assets of more than $1.2 trillion,
approximately 25 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in that year.
Companies make direct investments abroad by acquiring existing business assets of
foreign companies, by starting new businesses with "greenfield" investments in plant and
equipment, and by increasing their investments in foreign businesses that they• already own.
These foreign investments can be either wholly owned by the parent company or owned jointly
with foreign partners.'
'The minimum extent of the parent company's ownership share required to make an
investment qualify as "direct" rather than portfolio investment depends on the particular
definition of foreign direct investment. The common balance of payments definition of foreign
direct investment is based on ownership of at least 10 percent of the equity in the foreign
business. For some purposes, it is more sensible to concentrate on businesses where the parent
has a majority ownership interest.
1The heterogeneity of foreign direct investment reflects the diversity of motives for
making such investments.2 At one extreme, some foreign direct investment (like the purchase
of commercial real estate) is not fundamentally different from portfolio investment and the
motivation is the standard desire to diversify portfolio assets. A more traditional motivation for
PD! is to take advantage of low cost labor or proximity to raw materials. The primary reason
is probably to maintain or increase foreign sales and market share. Thus, manufacturing
companies that make products for industrial customers invest abroad in order to have closer
working relations with customers, especially when their products must be specifically designed
or modified for their customers. Many service companies must invest abroad if they want to
provide services to those local markets. And some manufacturers acquire foreign firms in order
to gain entry into local markets.
Government policies significantly influence the pattern of foreign direct investment,
sometimes intentionally and sometimes inadvertently.Some governments require local
investment (to create industrial jobs or achieve technology transfers) as a condition of access to
government procurement or licensing. Other governments use favorable tax and credit policies
to attract foreign investment. In contrast, some governments (e.g., Japan) are notorious for the
regulatory barriers that deter inbound foreign direct investment.
The effects of government policies on PD! are not always intended, but may be the
inadvertent by-products of policies designed to serve other purposes. Tariffs and other trade
2SeeFroot (1993) and Graham and Krugman (1989) and the references cited in those books
for a general discussion of foreign direct investment with particular reference to the United
States.
2barriers intended to protect domestic producers induce inbound foreigndirectinvestment.The
taxationof multinational companies can encourage or impede both inbound and outbound foreign
direct investment.
There has been a substantial public policy debate about the effects of inbound and
outbound foreign direct investment on the domestic economy.3 Much of the public concern is
stated in terms of the effect of foreign direct investment on employment, with opponents of
outbound FDL arguing that such FDI "takes production abroad" and reduces employment at
home while proponents of outbound FDI counter that such FDI creates markets for U.S. exports
to affiliates and through affiliates to foreign buyers. Economists recognize that this is a
misplaced concern because the American labor market works well in assuring that all who want
jobs at wages that reflect their skills can fmd work within a relatively short period of tune. As
Grahamand Krugmanemphasize: "Thenet impact of FDJ on U.S. employmentisapproximately
zero, and thetruth ofthisassertion has nothing to do with job gains and losses at the industry
level." (Graham and Knigman, 1989,p. 49;their italics). Studies that calculate thenumbers
ofjobs "lost" because particular firms shift activity abroad (e.g., Bergsten et. al., 1978. and
Hufbauer and Adler, 1968) do not take into account the absorption of those American workers
by other firms and industhes.
A related and more plausible concern is often expressed in terms of the impact of FDI
on the "quality" of jobs. The worry is that although the forces of supply and demand maintain
total employment, the shift of investment to foreign countries causes a substitution in the United
3See, for example, the discussions in Bergsten et. al. (1978), Graham and Knigman (1989)
and Hufbauer and Adler (1968).
3States of low wage jobs for the higher wage manufacturing jobs that have gone abroad. As a
general proposition, this is again incorrect. In a well-functioning labor market like ours, wages
reflect the skills of the workers and are therefore not affected by the entry or exit of individual
finns. There are some ways, however, in which foreign investment could affect wages. Market
imperfections that permit workers in some industries to be paid substantially more than
individuals with similar skills in other industries (e.g., union power or the monopoly power of
firms that share their monopoly profits with employees) do provide a mechanism by which the
mix of firms can affect the distribution of wages. In addition, even without such market
imperfections, FDI can affect the quality of jobs if it alters the marginal product of labor. This
can happen if FDI changes the domestic capital stock. It can also happen if FDI increases or
decreases the kinds of jobs that are more likely to involve substantial on-the-job training.
Training reflects the mix of industries and may be more important in capital intensive industries
than in other industries.4
This leads naturally to two questions about the effect of FDI on the capital stocks of both
the parent and host countries. First, what impact does an increase in the assets of foreign
affiliates have on the parent country's capital stock? Second, what impact does an inflow of
foreign direct investment have on the host country's capital stock? The answers to these
questions may well depend on the form of the foreign direct investment and on the reason for
4For an extensive discussion of the impact of outbound foreign direct investment on
employment in the United States, see Lipsey (1993). Lipsey concludes that the effect of
increased outbound PD! on the domestic employment by multinational companies is probably
slightly positive (as outbound FDI increases exports) and that the mix of domestic jobs shifts
toward more higher paying technical and managerial positions.
4the particular inflow or outflow of such investment.5 Although the available data do not permit
sucha disaggregated analysis, it is possible to assess the extent to which countriesthat
experiencesustainedhigh ratesof inboundor outbound foreigndirectinvestment have higher
or lower levels of domestic investment than would otherwise be expected. The current swdy
focuses on estimating the extent to which outbound foreign direct investment reduces domestic
investment in the parent country.
Previous studies of this question have been microeconomic partial equilibrium analyses
that haveaskedwhether fkn that investmore abroadreducetheir investmentathome.6
Although thesestudies can shed interestinglighton the behavior ofmultinational companies,
theydo not indicate the net effect on the economy as a whole when individual thns increase
their outbound FDI. When finns increase their overseas investment, the funds that they might
otherwise have used in the United States might instead finance greater domestic investment by
others, leaving both the aggregate capital outflow and the level of domestic investment
unchanged. Alternatively, the process of outbound FDI might increase the aggregate net capital
outflow and therefore reduce total domestic investment. Resolving the policy debate about the
effect of FDI on domestic investment requires resolving this macroeconomic general equilibrium
issue.
This paper presentsinformationon the general equilibrium effect offoreigndirect
5Since foreign direct investment is an endogenous variable in the complex system of trade
and capital flows, it would in principle be desirable to estimate a more fully articulated structural
model in which one can assess the extent to which changes in exogenous variables that alter FDI
influence domestic investment through this route. I return to this issue in section 4 below.
6 These studies include Blomstrom et al (1988), Lipsey and Weiss (1984), Severn (1972),
Stevens (1969)
5investment based on aggregate evidence about investment flows in the OECD countries. The
analysisfocuses on the effect of outbound foreign directinvestment and impliesthatsuch
investment does reduce domestic investment but that each dollarofassets in foreign affiliates
reduces the domestic capital stock by substantially less than a dollar. The best summary of the
evidence is that each dollar of assets in foreign affiliates reduces the domestic capital stock by
between20cents and 40 cents.
Beforelooking at the basis for these conclusions, it is useful to begin by considering
several alternative concepts of foreign direct investment and the relevant magnitude of each for
the United States. This is the subject of section one. The second section discusses alternative
theories of how outbound foreign domestic investment could affect the domestic capital stock.
Section 3 and4present investmentequations that areestimated using the OECD data. The
implications of this for the displacementquestionare discussed inthe finalsection. Appendix
Apresentsthe basicdata usedinsections3 and 4.
1. Three Concepts of Foreign Direct Investment
Several alternative conceptsof the stockofforeigndirect investment arepossible.A
very narrow definition measuresthe stock of FDI as the accumulatedcross-border flowof equity
anddebt from the parent company to its foreign subsidiary. The parent company may however
have control over a much larger volume offoreignassets,includingthosefinanced byretained
earnings and by borrowing from foreign and other domestic creditors.
-
This section startswiththe narrowest definition of outboundFDI andthen presents a
series of building blocksthat can beusedtoconstruct broader measures of foreign direct
6investment. For each building block, there is an estimate of the value from the point of view
of U.S. parents as of the end of 1989.
To avoid the special problems of comparing bank assets and liabilities with those of other
types of businesses, this analysis is limited to non-bank affiliates of non-bank U.S. corporate
parents. Similarly, in order to focus on foreign investments in which the U.S. parent has an
unambiguous controlling interest, the analysis is limited to majority owned non-bank affiliates
of U.S. non-bank parents.'
These calculations are based on thu from the 1989 Benchmark Survey of U.S.
Investment Abroad (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992). Although the Benchmark Survey
data report the current dollar values of the debts of foreign affihiat&, the value of assets and
therefore the value of equity is stated only as historic cost values. The value of original equity
investments and of retained earnings must therefore be adjusted for past price changes to
calculate the corresponding current cost values.
In the absence of the necessary detail on annual investment flows, I have done so by
using the historic cost and current cost values for the total equity of all U.S. foreign direct
investment (not just majority owned nonbank affiliates of non-bank parents) that are published
'The restrictions to nonbank firms and to those with majority ownership by the U.S. parent
together reduce the measured stock of U.S. owned FDI (according to the balance of payments
measure) by approximately 18 percent. All U.S. foreign direct investment had a value (according
to the balance of payments measure) in 1989 of $553 billion while the corresponding figure for
majority-owned nonbank affiliates was $452 billion. Both figures are estimates of current (1989
dollar) cost values.
8The foreign debt is translated into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates but is not adjusted
for changes in value due to changed in interest rates since the debt was issued.
7by the Department of Commerce. At yearend 1989, the total value of all U.S. foreign direct
investment abroad9 was $553 billion at current cost (1989 dollars) and $370 billion at historic
cost(Survey ofCurrent Business.. 1992). Since the debt component of this balance of payments
measure of the stock of foreign direct investment was $24 billion, the corresponding equity
amounts were $529 billion at current cost and $346 billion at historic cost, a ratio of 1.53.
Despite the obvious limitations of using a single ratio for both initial equity investments and
subsequent retained earnings, this ratio will be used to adjust all historic cost equity values in
the 1989 Benchmark Survey to the corresponding current cost estimates.
I turn now to an analysis of the different concepts of the foreign direct investment in the
nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents. The narrowest definition of foreign direct
investment is the net external finance from the U.S. varent to the forei2n affiliate. This external
finance at yearend 1989 consisted of $202 billion of initial equity investments of U.S. parents
(at current cost)'° and $25 billion of net debt provided by those same parents."
1. Net External finance from U.S. narents $227bfflion
la Equity from U.S. Parents ($202billion)
lb Net Debt from U.S. Parents ($ 25 billion)
This is the "balance of payments" measure of foreign direct investment. It is the sum of
the initial equity investments of U.S. parents, the subsequent retained earnings andany net debt
from U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates.
'°The historic cost number reported in the 1989 Benchmark Survey (Table III.C. 1) is $132
billion. Multiplying this by the factor 1.53 produces the current cost estimate of $202 billion.
The gross debt from U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates was $84 billion. This was
offset in large part by $59 billion of credit from affiliates to parents, leaving a net debt of
affiliates to parents of $25 billion. The balance of payments measure of foreign direct investment
includes oily the net debt and I follow that procedure in the current analysis.
8A small amount of additional equity investment and credit is extended to these overseas
affiliates by other U.S. investors and creditors. The equity invested in majority owned
businesses by American companies other than the parent company is very small, only a
cumulative $1 billion.Americancreditors other than the parent firm provided credit of $22
billion.'2
2. External finance from other U.S. sources $ 23 billion
2a Equity from other U.S. investors ($1billion)
2b Debt from other U.S. sources ($22billion)
The external finance from U.S. sources is substantially augmented by equity and debt
from foreign sources. Even among these affiliates that are majority owned by their U.S.
parents, foreign sources invested equity of $92 billion at current cost'3 and foreign creditors
provided $567 billio&4.
3. External finance from foreiQn sources $659billion
3a Equity from foreign sources ($ 92 billion)
3b Debt from foreign sources ($567billion)
'2The credit from the U.S. parent as well as from other U.S. sources includes trade credit
as well as other forms of credit.
This current dollar figure is based on the historic cost value of $60 billion.
The 1989 Benchmark Survey reports that the total liabilities of the majority-owned
nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents was $673 billion. This included current liability and
long-term debt of $562 billion and "Other liabilities" (including deferred taxes of the subsidiary)
of $111 billion. Subtracting the $106 billion of gross debt provided by U.S. parents and other
U.S. sources (i.e., the sum of $25 billion of net debt from parents, $59 billion of offsettingdebt
from affiliates to parents that is counted as part of the gross debt of the affiliates, and $22 billion
of debt from other U.S. sources) leaves a balance of $567 billion of debt supplied by foreign
sources.
9The final source of capital in the foreign affiliates is the Eetaifled earnings that were
reinvested after paying dividends to parents and others. The 1989 current cost estimate for the
accumulated value of these retained earnings was $328 billion. Dividing this aggregate among
the three classes of investors in proportion to their historic cost values of retained earnings
implies:
4. Retained earnings $ 328 billion
4a Share of U.S. parents ($ 225 billion)
4b Share of other U.S. investors ($1 billion)
4c Share of foreign equity investors ($ 102 billion)
With thesebuildingblocks, it is possible to define three progressively broader concepts
ofouthoundforeign direct investment.The firstistheNet ExternalFinancefrom U.S. Sources.
Thisisthe sum ofIand2aboveor $250 billion.
The secondmeasure ofU.S. foreigndirectinvestment addsthevalueofthe retained
earningsofforeign affiliates attributableto U.S.investors(thesum of 4a and 4b or $226billion)
to the net external finance from U.S. parents andotherU.S. sources. This Net Finance from
U.S. Sources13 had a value of $476 billion.
Thethird naturaldefinition is the value of the assets in the foreign affiliate, regardless
of who finances those assets and of whether the finance is by debt or equity. This definition.
theValue of Assets of U.S.Foreign Affiliates,is thesum ofthe four buildingblocks or $1,237
billion.
The three concepts and the associated magnitudes are shown in Table 1.
"Thisexceedsthe Official Balance of Payments definition of the stock of U.S. foreign
investment by including thevalueof theequityanddebtof U.S. investors andcreditorswho are
not parents of the foreign affiliates.
102. The DisplacementEffect of Outbound Direct investment:Partial Ecuilibrium VS.General
EQuilibriumAnalysis
1-low does the decision of an American firm to invest abroad in a foreignsubsidiaryaffect
thetotal amount of investment in the United States? Despite the widespread interest in this
question, there has been no formal analysis or empirical investigation of the general equilibrium
effect of outbound FDIon domesticinvestment.
2.1TheBehavior of Individual Finns
The commonpopulardiscussion of thisissue treats it as a partial equilibrium question
ofwhere corporateproductionwill occur. As notedabove,opponents of outbound FDI argue
that suchinvestmentreduces domesticproduction by substituting forexports whiledefendersof
outboundFDI arguethat overseassubsidiaries increasethe marketfor U.S. exports andtherefore
increase production in the United States. There areundoubtedlyexamples of both possibilities
in actual practice. These countervailing effects may explain why the very careful study of
individual multinational firmsbyStevens and Lipsey (1988) failed to find anysignificanteffects
ofoverseasproduction on domestic exports andinvestment.16
An alternative partial equilibrium analysis would startwiththe corporate financial
decisions andask whethera firm thatinvests moreabroad will investlessathome.Inthe
simplesttextbook version of the investmentdecision, thefirmcan borrowas much as itwants
at a fixed interest rate andthereforeinvests until the marginal product of capital equals thatrate
16Similarevidencethat outboundFDI isnot associated withexport displacementisreported
in Blomstrom et. al. (1988) and in LipseyandWeiss (1981, 1984).
•11Table 1
Alternative Measures of Foreign Direct Investment
Conceot of Forei2n Direct Investment Value at Year End 1989
1. Net External Finance from U.S. Sources $ 250 billion
(1+2)
2. NetFinancefrom U.S. Sources $ 476 billion
(1+ 2 + 4a + 4b)
3. Value of Assets of U.S. Foreign Affiliates $ 1237 billion
(1+2+3+4)
All values are adjusted to current cost in 1989 dollars.
12of interest. In such an economy, borrowing to finance overseas investment does not alter the
firm's funds available for domestic investment.
Actual corporate experience is very far from these textbook models. The following
simplified version of corporate capital budgeting shows how a firm's decision to invest abroad
could reduce its domestic investment. In this view, the company starts with a fixed amount of
after tax profits and a dividend payout that its shareholders expect. 'There is some but very little
room to vary dividends from the expected amount. The combination of the retained earnings
(after this dividend payout) and the company's desired debt to capital ratio determines the
amount that the company can borrow and therefore the firm's total funds available for capital
investments.'7 Since this capital budget calculation is done for the multinational corporation
as a whole rather than for individual subsidiaries, the result is a capital budget for the entire
corporation. Any use of that capital abroad reduces the amount of capital available for domestic
investment within the firm.'8
However, as the analysis of section 1 indicated, much of the capital invested in U.S.
affiliates overseas is raised abroad. it is clear that the share of foreign-source debt and equity
in the U.S foreign affiliates is far greater than the share of such foreign-source debt and equity
in the financing of the domestic U.S. industry. This reflects the fact that most American firms
"The company could of course modify this by new equity issues, share repurchases, and
divestiwres but these should
be seen as unusual events rather than as part of the annual capital budgeting process.
Stevens and Lipsey- (1988) -investigate the financial interdependence between foreign
investment and domestic investment over time in a sample of U.S. multinational firms and find
that overseas investment does reduce domestic investment through this channel. Their formal
model lies between the two extremes described in the current text: finns do not have a fixed
debt-to-capital ratio but the cost of funds is a function of that ratio.
13are more likely to borrow abroad to fmance overseas assets than to finance domestic assets. The
reason for thisis unclear. Itmay reflect a desire to hedge foreign currency profits with foreign
currencydebt, an ability to borrow morecheaply when collateral is available, or other aspects
oftheriskand returnoftbancthgbehavior. Thissegmentationof borrowingmay beaform
ofsuboptimal behaviorsimilarto the widely observed failure of portfolio managers to diversify
investment.
Similarly,American firms are more likely to seek foreign joint venture partners for
overseas subsidiaries (in order to get market access or other benefits of having a local partner)
than they are to seek such equity investors here in the United States. The foreign equity investor
is also likely to regard such direct investment as a joint venture partner within its own country
as less risky than investing in the United States.
In short, even if outbound FIN substitutes for other investments within the firm's capital
budget, more of the funds to fmance that outbound FDI are likely to come from foreign sources
than would be the case for domestic investment.
2.2Macroeconomic General Euuilibrium Effects
To assess the net impact of outbound FDI on total investment in the United States it is
important to look beyond the partial equilibrium analysis of individual firms. The net impact
of outbound FDI depends on the extent to which that outbound FIN changes the aggregate net
outflow of capital from the United States, including net portfolio investment as well as net direct
investment.
In a world of perfect capital mobility in which the total pool of world savings moves to
finance those investments with the highest risk-adjusted rates of return, an increase in U.S.
14direct investment abroadneednot haveanyeffect ontheU.S. capital stock.Funds would
automatically flow in to finance domestic U.S.investmentsthat earn the required rate of return.
But although the integration of global capital markets appears to be increasing, we are
stilla long way from the textbook model of perfectcapitalmarket integration.Gross
international capital flows are large, but sustained net flows are relatively small. As Charles
Horioka and I showed nearly 15 years ago (Feldstein and Horioka. 1980), a nation's savings
tend to beinvestedin the country where they originateThe"saving retentioncoefficient"
(thefraction of a marginal dollar of saving that is invested domestically) is estimated to be
between 0.8 and 0.9 on average for theOECI)countries.This isdramatically different from
the world of perfect capital mobility in which a nation's rate of investment would not depend
on itssavingrateandtherefore in which the saving retention coefficient would bezero.
Paradoxically,the extreme no-net-capital-flow case (a saving retention coefficient of 1.0
that is uninfluenced by the volume of outbound or inbound FDI) has the same implication in the
current context as the perfect capital mobility case: an outflow of direct investment does not
change the amount of net domestic investment. Any net outflow of FDI in this case would be
offsetbyareduction in outbound portfolio investment or an increase in inboundportfolio
investment. The previous estimates of theFeldstein-Horioka type investment-savingequations
did not explicitly test whether the amountofdomestic investment is influenced by the outbound
orinbound F1)I. That is the subject of the next two sections.
19Thisfact has since been replicated many times. See Frankel (1992) and Mussa and
Goldstein (1993) for discussions of thisliterature and comments onthereasons whysavings
remain at home even in a world capital market that appears to bequite closelylinked and very
active. See also Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991).
15A more likely possibility is that the Feldstein-Horioka relation relates to portfolio
investment rather than to direct investment. In the extreme case, an extra dollar of national
saving wouldremainin domestic portfolio assets unless it is used by a multinational corporation
to finance a cross-border direct investment. Such an outbound FDI would reduce the funds
available for domestic investment by an equal amount, as the above corporate budget example
suggests. If the portfolio investments were completely segmented into national markets in this
way, the effect of the outbound FDI on domestically available funds would not be offset by any
international flow of portfolio capital and the aggregate domestic investment would be reduced
by the full amount of the direct investment outflow.
The evidence in the next two sections support the idea that foreign direct investment
transfers capital across borders with very little offsetting net portfolio investment. More
specifically, the evidence indicates that each dollar of outbound FDI reduces domestic investment
by approximately one dollar.
3. Estimates of the Effects of FDI on Domestic Investment
The estimates presented in this section are an extension of earlier work reported in a
number of papers beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980)•WThebasic Feldstein-Horioka
specification relates the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP to the ratio of gross national
saving to GDP. Since these ratios are calculated as decade averages, the analysis relates to
sustained differences among countries rather than year to year changes. The specification
assumes that the national differences in saving determine national differences in investment
20SeeFrankel (1992) and Mussa and Goldstein (1993) for summaries of this literature.
16rather than the reverse.Sincethese specification issues have been discussed extensively in
previousarticles2t, I will not comment on them here.
Theinnovation in the current study is to add data on inbound and outboundFDIto the
previous bivariate specification. The simplest form of the resulting equation is:
GDIIGDP= a+b (GNS/GDPI+c[(FDI-out)/GDP] +d((FD[-in)IGDPj+ a
where GD! is gross domestic investment, GNS is gross national
saving, GD? is gross domestic product, the two types of PD! are denoted FDI-out and FDI-in,
and u is a stochastic disturbance. The individual variables in the numerator and denominator
of each ratio are flows at annual rates denominated in current dollars in national currencies. The
ratios are decade averages of annual ratios for each country. More general specifications with
additional variables are discussed in section 4.
By definition, GD! includes only the investment done within the geographic boundaries
of the home country. Investment by foreign affiliates of the home country's multinationals are
excluded. Investment within the geographic boundaries of the home country that is done by the
local affiliates of foreign multinationals is included in GD!. The GNS figures include the saving
in the form of retained earnings of foreign affiliates of the home country's multinationals. The
foreign direct investment values are based on the balance of payments definition and refer to all
foreign affiliates, not just majority owned or nonbank affiliates. These data are not ideal but
they are the best data available for this study.
Although the OECD produces consistent data on GD!. GNS and GDP, there are no
2l5Feldstein(1983) and Feldstein and Bachetta (1991) as well as the references cited in
the previous footnote.
17yofficial OECD data on Fl)!. The data on FDI come from the International Monetary FunF.
The limited availability of data on P01 restricts the sample to 18 of the 24 OECD countries for
the decadeofthe 1980s and 15 of those countries for the decade of the 1970s. This section
presents separate results for both samples as well as for a pooled sample of 33 observations.
For all of these countries it is possible to obtain estimates of PD! excluding retained earnings
(RE). It is also possible to obtain the amount of retained earnings of these foreign affiliates for
nine of the countries during the decade of the 1970s and ten of the countries during the decade
of the 1980s. Estimates are also presented for these smaller samples.
The first three equations presented in Table 2 are the standard investment-savings relation
without FDI. The estimated savings retention coefficients for this sample of OECD countries
are 0.87 (s.e. =0.10)for the 1970s and 0.74 (s.c. =0.12)for the 1980s, very similar to the
estimates obtained with the larger samples of OECD countries in past research. The savings
retention coefficient for the pooled data is 0.80 (s.e. =0.07)and lies between the two individual
decade estimates.
In equation 4 of Table 2. the coefficient of the FDI-out variable is -1.73 (s.e. =0.90)
and the coefficient of the P01-in variable is 0.80 (s.e. =1.11).Adding these two Fl)! variables
to the traditional saving-investment equation leaves the estimated savings retention coefficient
virtually unchanged at 0.84 (s.e.=0.10).
The coefficient of the FD!-out variable which is of primary interest in the current analysis
is quite stable in the different time periods and specifications. It is always negative, implying
These data are published in the Balance of Payments Yearbook. The current study uses
updated unpublished data. The actual data are presented in the Appendix to this paper.
18that the aggregate level of domestic investment in a country declines when outboundFDI
increases. Since this effect is conditional on given levels of national saving and inbound FDI,
it implies that other international capital flows (inbound and outbound portfolio investment and
borrowing) do not adjust to offset the direct effect of outbound FDI on domestic investment.
The coefficient of outbound FDI is -1.73 (s.e.= 0.62) in the 1970s and -1.65 (s.e.= 0.69) in
the 1980s when FD! is defmed as a cross-border capital transfer (i.e., excluding retained
earnings of the foreign affiliates). Adding the retained earnings of foreign
affiliates (equation 7) leaves the coefficient for 1970 essentially unchanged (-1.42 with s.c. =
0.40)and increases the absolute size of the 1980 coefficient only slightly (-1.87 with s.e. =0.63).
It would of course be desirable to distinguish the response of domestic investment to
outbound cross-border FDI flows from the response of domestic investment to the retained
earnings of the foreign affiliates. Unfortunately, there are too few observations to make such
an estimate. Attempts to use the samples corresponding to equations 7 through 9 to look at the
retained earnings variable separately (in addition to the other variables already in those
equations) results in almost no residual degrees of freedom and therefore to very unstable
coefficient estimates with very large standard errors. it is not possible to determine statistically
whether a one dollar increase in GNS due to an increase in the RE of foreign affiliates has the
same impact on GD! as a one dollar rise in GNS due to domestic savings.2' Similarly, when
outbound FM is defined to include the retained earnings of foreign affiliates (equations 7
through 9) it is not clear whether the reaction to the cross-border FM flow is the same as the
Recall that gross national saving includes the retained earnings of foreign affiliates.
19Table 2
Effectsof National Saving and FDI on Domestic Investment
Equat. Period RE N Coast. GNS FDI..Out WI-In Adj.it'
1 1970s - 15 0.040.87 0.85
(0.02) (0.10)
2 1980s - 18 0.070.74 0.67
(0.03) (0.12)
3 Pooled - 33 0.050.80 0.79
(0.02) (0.07)
4 1970s No 5 0.050.84-1.73 0.80 0.87
(0.03) (0.10) (0.90) (1.11)
5 1980s No 18 0.080.74-1.65 0.47 0.74
(0.03) (0.12) (0.69) (0.86)
6 PooledNo 33 0.070.77-1.58 0.59 0.84
(0.02) (0.07) (0.47) (0.62)
7 1970s Yes 9 0.060.76-1.42 2.18 0.90
(0.03) (0.12) (0.46) (0.63)
8 1980sYes 10 0.100.59-1.87 2.51 0.67
(0.05) (0.23) (0.63) (1.09)
9 PooledYes 19 0.080.66-1.71 2.38 0.82
(0.03) (0.11)(0.37) (0.59)
Thecolumn marked RE indicates whether the FDI variables include or exclude the retained earnings of
the foreign affiliates.
20reaction to FDJ-out that is achieved without a cross-border flow by an increase in the retained
earnings of the affiliate.
The reaction of domestic home country investment to a dollar of dividends that is
repatriated by the subsidiary to the parent company is ambiguous a priori as well. Although the
direct effect of the dividend repatriation would be to add to the domestic capital stock, this could
be offset to the extent that the dividend induces a reduction in inbound portfolio investment or
an increase in outbound direct or portfolio investment. Since the econometric evidence cannot
resolve this ambiguity, section 5examinesthe implications of the two alternative extreme
assumptions that subsidiary retained earnings reduce domestic (home country) investment dollar-
for-dollar and, alternatively, that they do not affect domestic investment at all.
4. AdditionalVariables and Simultaneity Problems
The interpretation of the coefficients in Table 2 is clouded by the fact that the saving rate
and the two FDI ratios are endogenous variables in the overall economic system. In particular,
the levels of inbound and outbound FDI are likely to be correlated with variables that favor
higher domestic rates of investment. A country that offers a Rgood environment" for domestic
investment is also likely to attract more inbound PD! and may also experience less outbound
FDI. This section shows that this problem of missing variables does indeed bias the coefficients
shown in section 3. increasing the absolute size of both the FDI-out and FDI-in coefficients.
The results in this section are thus quite different from the earlier studies of potential bias
in the estimated savings retention coefficient in the simpler Feldstein-Horioka specification.
Since it is certainly possible that some of the same factors that cause a countiy to have a higher
21saving rate might also cause it to have a higher investment rate, Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991)
also estimatedthe basic specificationby an instnnnental variable estimation procedure using
demographiccharacteristics and social securityvariables as instruments for thenational saving
rate.Although the relativelysmallsampleoffewer thantwo dozencountries limitsthe
relevance ofthe consistencypropertyof IV estimation, the similarity of the OLS and IV
estimatesprovides some reassurancethat the potential endogeneityof the savings rate is nota
sourceofsignificant bias.Furthersupport for the assumption that long-term intercountry
differences in saving cause long-term differences in investment (rather than the reverse or a
simultaneous equations relation) is obtained by dividing national saving into private saving and
government saving and noting that both components of national saving have essentially the same
effect on domestic investment in a generalized Feldstein-llorioka specification (Feldstein and
Bacchetta, 1991).
Although it would be desirable to re-estimate the equations in Table 2 using an
instrumental variable approach, I have been unable to find any variables that would be
satisfactory instruments. I decidedthereforeto pursue a different approach to reducing the
possible bias in the estimated FDI coefficients by expanding the specification of the investment
equation to include additional determinants of investment that might also be correlated with
either or both of the FIN variables. Although some bias might remain even in this specification
because not all possible variables are included, this method is preferable to using an instrumental
variable estimation procedure with a very small sample and very inadequate instruments.
Table 3 summarizes the results of these more general specifications. The evidence
confirms that outbound FDI does reduce domestic investment but the coefficients are now
22absolutely smaller, indicating thatthepreviously omittedvariableswere common factors that
affectedFDI-out and GD! in similar ways.24
For example, equation 1 of Table 3 (which is estimated for the pooled sample of 33
country-decade observations) includes four variables in addition to the saving rate and FIN
variables: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the country is in Europe (E); (2) the size of
the country as measured by its avenge population during the decade (SIZE); (3) the avenge
inflation rate during the decade (INF); and (4) the avenge growth rate of GDP during the
decade (GRO). These variables are listed as "Other Variables" in the description of equation
1. Those "other variables" with a t-statistic between 1 and 2 are marked with an asterisk while
those with a t-statistic in excess of two are marked with two asterisks. Thus E, SIZE and INF
have t-statistics greater than 2 while GRO is not statistically significant. In this specification,
the coefficient of FDI-out is -1.17 with a standard error of 0.47.
Equation 2 adds the average short-term interest nte (INT) and deletes the insignificant
growth variable. This specification, which has the highest adjusted R2 of all the variable
combinations that I have examined, also suggests that the coefficient of FDI-out is approximately
minus one, i.e., that each dollar of FDI-out reduces GD! by about one dollar.
The next four equations in Table 3arefor the individual decades. The absolute values
of the coefficient of FIN-out are slightly smaller than one in each of these specifications. The
large standard errors in these equations should be interpreted in the context of the smaller
24'Fhe coefficients of FDI-in change even more substantially and are now insignificant in
every case, indicating that the inflow of FDI does not appear to alter the domestic investment
rate. Presumably the capital inflow in the form of inbound FIN substitutes for inbound portfolio
investment or induces other balancing transactions.
23samples for individual decades (only 15 observations for the 1970sand 18 observations for the
1980s) which, together with the additional variables, leaves as few as 7 residual degreesof
freedom. But taken together with the pooled data of equations 1 and 2 and the separate decade
estimates for the simpler specifications in Table 2, it seems most appropriate to conclude that
each dollar of cross-border FDI-out reduces domestic investment by approximately one dollar.
The FDI variables reported in equations 1 through 6 of Table 3 all measure FDI
excluding retained earnings. Although eliminating the eight countries that do not provide
information on retained earnings would leave too small a sample of observations for either
decade alone, it is possible to use the pooled sample of 19 observations for the two decades.
The results are shown in equations 7, 8 and 9. The first two of these repeat the two
specifications of equations 1 through 6 while equation 9 is the specification with the highest
adjusted R2 when the FDI variables are defined to include retained earnings.
The coefficients are similar in all three specifications. The estimated effect of FDI-out
is slightly larger in absolute size than in the pooled estimates of equations 1 and 2 but, given the
small sample and large standard errors, is not significantly different from -1.0. The major
difference from the other equations in Table 3 is that the coefficient of the FDI-in variable rises
to approximately 1.0 and becomes nearly twice its standard error. This implies that the retained
earnings of foreign affiliates in a given host country, like other forms of domestic saving in that
country, increases domestic investment in that host country.
24Table 3
Impactof Additional Variablesonthe Estimated Effect
of Foreign DirectInvestmenton Domestic Investment
Equat. Period GNS FDI-out WI-in Other Variables Adj. R1
N; RE
Pooled 0.76-1.17 0.16 E**, SIZE,INF** 0.90
33; No (0.07) (0.47) (0.50) ORO
2. Pooled 0.79-1.10 -0.04 E*S. SIZE, [NF 0.92
33; No (0.05) (0.40) (0.44) INT"
3. 1970s 0.85-0.92 -0.03 E, SIZE, INF* 0.89
15; No (0.17) (0.91) (1.21) GRO
4. 1970s 0.87-0.83 0.00 E, SlZE*, INFO. 89
15; No (0.11) (1.04) (1.16) INT
5. 1980s 0.65-0.80 -0.19 E, S12E, INF0.91
18; No (0.09) (0.55) (0.57) GRO
6. 1980s 0.65-0.81 -0.20 E, SIZE. LNF 0.91
18; No (0.10) (0.54) (0.54) INT
7. Pooled 0.49-1.59 1.41 E, SIZE, 11* 0.89
19; Yes (0.14) (0.42) (0.58) GRO
8. Pooled 0.62-1.36 0.94 E*, SIZE. INF 0.92
19; Yes (0.11) (0.38) (0.54) INT'
9. Pooled 0.55-1.37 0.92 E*. SIZE, INT 0.93
19; Yes (0.11) (0.31) (0.49)
Each equation also contains a constant term. The Fill-in and FDI-out variables exclude retained earnings
in equations 1 through6 andincludes retained earnings in equations 7 through 9. See text for definitions
of "Other Variables.'
25More generally,the evidencein thissectionimplies thatoutflowsof foreign direct
investmentreduce domesticinvestment ona dollar-for-dollarbasis andthatthis reduction isnot
offset byan international shiftin portfolio investment. This isconsistent with a view thatthe
Feldstein-Iiorioka segmentation ofcapitalmarkets appliesto portfolio investment andthatdirect
investmentcircumvents thisbarrier to capital mobility. Similarly,foreigndirectinvestment
inducesU.S. firms to use much more foreign debt and equity finance in their majority owned
foreign affiliates than they would use for domestic investments. In that way, the financingof
FDI also makes available the advantages of foreign portfolio financing in a way that would not
occur without the direct investment.
5. TheEffect of Outbound FDI on Foreien Assets and the Domestic Capital Stock
By combining the parameter estimates of sections 3 and 4 with the evidence on the
sources of capital of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals in section 2 it is possible to answer
the fundamental question of how much the U.S. domestic capital stock declines per dollar of
additional capital in the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals.
The answer to this question depends on how that foreign affiliate capital is fmanced. The
parameter estimates of sections 3 and 4 imply that on average within the OECD each dollar of
cross-border external finance reduces domestic investment by one dollar.
The data analyzed in section 2 show that approximately 20 cents of each dollar of the existing
U.S. foreign affiliate capital is financed by such a cross-border flow of capital from the United
States. Of the remainder, 1$ cents comes from the U.S. share of retained earnings of the
foreign affiliate and 62 cents comes from foreign debt and equity sources.
26Before considering the implication of this avenge financing mix, I will consider two
simpler cases:
Pure Parent Finance
Consider first the simplest case in which the incremental foreign affiliate capital is
financed exclusively by the U.S. parent with no foreign equity or debt. If the U.S. general
equilibriumresponseto cross-border capital outflows is similar to the average OECD response,
eachdollarof parent-to-affiliate finance reduces the U.S. domestic capital stockby one dollar.
In this extremecase,each dollar of increased capital in the foreign affiliate reduces the U.S.
domestic capital stock by one dollar.
Levera2ed Retained Earnings Finance
As a second and much more common case, consider the foreign affiliate that uses
retained earnings to finance an incremental investment and that combines those foreign retained
earnings with local debt. The sources of financing per unit of incremental capital in the
subsidiary can be defined as:
s -theretained earnings of the subsidiary attributable to the U.S. parent and other
U.S. equity investors
-theretained earnings of the subsidiary attributable to non-U.S. sources
-thedebt supplied by non-U.S. creditors
By assumption, in this cases +s1'+b*=1.
The alternative to investing the retained earnings of the subsidiary would be to distribute
27them as dividendsto theU.S. and foreign equity owners. The econometric analysis of sections
3 and 4 was not able to measure the average OECD response to changes in retained earnings or
dividend repatriations. The effect on domestic capital formation in the borne country of the
subsidiary's choice between retaining earnings and repatriating those earnings as dividends
cannot be settled by a orion analysis either. Considertherefore the alternative possibilities. If
a dollar of repatriated dividends would add one dollar to the U.S. gross domestic investment,
an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with leveraged retained earnings reduces
the U.S. capital stock by s <1dollars. To the extent that the repatriation of retained earnings
displaces other financial capital inflows or increase financial capital outflows, the depressing
effect on the U.S. capital stock would be smaller than s.
The analysis of section 1 shows that the retained earnings attributable to U.S. investors
(corresponding to s in the current calculation) were $226 billion in 1989, that the retained
earnings attributable to foreign investors was $102 billion, and that the debt from foreign sources
was $567 billion. If the relative magnitudes of these three financing sources are used to
approximate the financing of the leveraged retained earnings investment, we obtain 5= 226/895
=0.25.With these assumptions, an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with
leveraged retained earnings reduces the U.S. capital stock by 25 cents. This is an upper limit
of the plausible range because it is based on the assumption that any retained earnings that are
not invested by the foreign subsidiary would otherwise add dollar-for-dollar to the U.S. capital
stock.
28Average Financing
The observed aggregate financing mix described in section 1 reflects bothnew equity and
debttransfersfrom parents to affiliates and the subsequent reinvestment of retainedearnings.
Both types of investments are leveragedwithforeign debt. While individual investments will
use different financing mixes, the overall financing mix may remain relatively unchanged if the
mixof new investment and reinvestment continues to be about the same.25
To analyze this overall average financing case, the three sources of financing identified
in the "leveraged retained earnings case" must be expanded to include
e -theexternal equity capital provided by the U.S. parent and other U.S. investors
e-theexternal equity capital provided by non-U.S. sources
b -thedebt supplied by the U.S. parent and other U.S. creditors
Now ee*+b+b*+a+s=1.
The econometric results of section 3 and 4 imply that each dollar of cross borderequity
and debt (e and b in the current notation) reduces domestic investment by one dollar. Ifwe
assume also that each dollar of foreign subsidiary retained earnings that is not invested in the
affiliate would otherwise be repatriated and would add dollar-for-dollar to domestic investment
in the United States, an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with the observed
average mix of financing sources would reduce the U.S. capital stock by e +b+ s <1
dollars. Once again this is an upper limit because the repatriation of subsidiary retained earnings
may not increase domestic investment dollar for dollar.
It would be desirable to compare the composition of financing of U.S. foreign affiliates
in the 1989 benchmark survey with the financing composition in earlier studies.
29The analysisof section1 showed that of the $1237 billion of total assets, the external
equity finance from U.S. sources was $203 billion, the debt from U.S. parents and other U.S.
creditors was $47 billion, and the share of retained earnings attributable to U.S. parents and
other investors was $226 billion. In this case, e + b =0.20and e + b ÷s=0.38.If each
dollar of retained earnings would otherwise be repatriated and add one dollar to domestic
investment, each dollar of foreign affiliate investment financed by this average mix of sources
reduces the U.S. capital stock by 0.38 dollars. At the other extreme, if the inflow of repatriated
earnings would only displace some other portfolio inflow or induce a portfolio outflow, each
dollar of foreign affiliate investment financed by this avenge mix of sources reduces the U.S.
capital stock by only 0.20 dollars.
Although individual investments will use different financing mixes, this overall financing
case is probably the best indication of how the financing of the foreign affiliate capital stock
evolves. If so, it implies that each dollar of displaced domestic capital in the U.S. adds between
$2.60 and $5.00 to the capital stock of U.S. foreign affiliates.
This relation between foregone domestic investment and the increase in the capital stock
of U.S. foreign affiliates is important for assessing the impact of outbound FDI on the national
income of the United States. The effect of outbound U.S. foreign direct investment on U.S.
national income depends on the rate of return earned on such investments, the cost of the foreign
capital, and the amount of taxes paid to the foreign government. Although U.S. firms that
invest abroad presumably select the allocation of capital that maximizes the present value of the
finns' after tax profits, the existence of foreign taxes implies that their decisions will not in
general maximize U.S. national income. The firm may be indifferent between paying taxes to
30the U.S. government and a foreign government but only the former remains a part of U.S.
national income. An evaluation of whether the outbound U.S. FDI increases or decreases U.S.
national income requires balancing the tax losses to foreign governments against the advantage
of the increased use of foreign source capital that accompanies foreign direct investment. That






Baxter, Marianne and Mario Crucini (1993), "Explaining Saving-Investment Correlations,"
American Economic Review 83:3 pp. 416-36
Bergsten, C. Fred, Thomas HorsE, and Theodore H. Moran (1978), American Multinationals
and American Interests, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Blomstrom, Magnus, Robert B. Lipsey, and Ksenia Kulchycky (1988), "U.S. and Swedish
Direct Investment and Exports," in Robert E. Baldwin, Ed., Trade Policy Issues and
Empirical Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 259-297.
Feldstein, Martin (1983), "Domestic Saving and International Capital Movements in the Long
Run and the Short Run," European Economic Review.
Feldstein,Martin (1994), "Taxes,Leverage and the National Return on Foreign Direct
1nvestment,'forthcoming.
Feldstein, Martin and Phillipe Bacchetta (1991), "National Saving and International Investment,"
in The Economics of Savings, John Shoven and Douglas Bernheim, (eds.), Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Feldstein, Martin and Charles Horiolca (1980), "Domestic Savings and International Capital
Flows," The 1970 W.A. Mackintosh Lecture at Queen's University, Economic Journal.
Frankel, Jeffrey (1991), "Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s." in National
Saving and Economic Performance, D. Bernheim and J. Shoven (eds.): Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
32Froot, Kenneth (1993), ForeiRn Direct Investment Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Graham, EdwardM.and Paul Krugman (1991), Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
J-Iutbauer, Gary C., and F.M. Adler (1968). Overseas Manufacturing Investment and the
Balance of Payments, Tax Policy Research Study No. 1, U.S. Treasury Department,
Washington, D.C.
Lipsey, Robert (1993) "Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy," in The Effects of
International Taxation on Multinational Corporations. M. Feldstein, J. Hines and R.G.
Hubbard (eds.) NBER Conference Volume, forthcoming.
Lipsey. Robert and Merle Yahr Weiss (1981), 'Foreign Production and Exports in
Manufacturing Industries," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. LXIII, No. 4,
November, pp. 488-494.
Lipsey. Robert and Merle Yahr Weiss (1984). "Foreign Production and Exports of Individual
Firms," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 66, No. 2. May, pp. 304-308.
Mussa,Michaeland Morris Goldstein (1993), "The Integration of World Capital Markets,' in
Chan2ingCapitalMarkets: Implications for MonetaryPolicy,1993 Annualconference
oftheKansas CityFederalReserve Bank. (forthcoming).
Severn,Alan (1972), 'Investmentand Financial Behavior of American Direct Investorsin
Manufacturing,' in Fritz Machiup, Walter Salant, and Loria Tarshis, Eds., j]ç
International Mobility and Movement of Capital, New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Stevens, Guy and Robert Lipsey (1992) 'Interactions between Domestic and Foreign
33Investment," Journal of International Money and Finance, 11 pp 40-52.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic




DecadeAverages of Investment, Saving and FDI Ratios: 1970-79
Ratios to GD?
OutboundInboundOutboundInbound
Country GDI GNS FDI FDI RE RE
Australia 0.250 0.238 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.006
Austria 0.286 0.278 0.001 0.005 NA NA
Belgium/Luxembourg 0.227 0.232 0.007 0.015 NA NA
Canada 0.240 0.224 0.008 0.007 NA NA
Finland 0.285 0.265 0.002 0.002 NA NA
France 0.255 0.259 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000
Germany 0.234 0.244 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001
Italy 0.258 0.260 0.002 0.003 NA NA
Japan 0.345 0.353 0.003 0.000 NA NA
Netherlands 0.234 0.246 0.018 0.010 0.006 0.002
New Zealand 0.260 0.217 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008
Spain 0.266 0.251 0.001 0.006 NA NA
Sweden 0.216 0.209 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 0.199 0.180 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.005
UnitedStates 0.194 0.197 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001
* Excludes RetainedEarnings
NANot AvailableTable A.2
DecadeAverages or Investment,Saving and FI)1Ratios:1980-90
Ratios to GD?
OutboundInboundOutboundInbound
Country ODI GNS FDI FDI RE RE
Australia 0.244 0.19$ 0.007 0.013 0.003 0.004
Austria 0.245 0.242 0.003 0.003 NA NA
Belgium/Luxembourg 0.176 0.171 0.014 0.020 NA NA
Canada 0.215 0.198 0.012 0.003 NA NA
Denmark 0.181 0.152 0.006 0.003 NA NA
Finland 0.258 0.237 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.001
France 0.209 0.204 0.0 10 0.006 0.000 0.000
Germany 0.206 0.227 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.000
Italy 0.225 0.2 16 0.004 0.003 NA NA
Japan 0.300 0.321 0.007 0.000 NA NA
Netherlands 0.197 0.225 0.027 0.013 0.009 0.005
New Zealand 0.242 0.182 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.006
Norway 0.259 0.267 0.011 0.006 NA NA
Portugal 0.282 0.237 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.001
Spain 0.221 0.208 0.003 0.015 NA NA
Sweden 0.188 0.169 0.020 0.004 0.005 0.001
United Kingdom 0.176 0.166 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.006
United States 0.179 0.163 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.000
Excludes Retained Earnings
NANot Available
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